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Venezuela is a nation in decline.  Despite vast petroleum reserves, decades of disastrous policies 
enacted by increasingly authoritarian regimes led to socioeconomic and political descent, 
including increased poverty, food insecurity, and rationing of water and electricity.  Recently, 
Venezuela’s tailspin has coincided with a severe multi-year drought, ranging from 2013 to 2016.  
This study seeks to determine the effect of this drought on the current turmoil in Venezuela, 
examining the oft-debated theory that environmental scarcity may cause conflict.  This 
assessment begins with a review of the relevant scarcity-conflict literature, which highlighted 
the importance of both environmental factors and water management policy when evaluating 
water scarcity.  With this important bifurcation in mind, the study uses a quantitative 
assessment to determine if there is a statistical relationship between drought and intrastate 
conflict in Venezuela and Syria.  Case studies provide a more nuanced assessment of 
socioeconomic factors and the effectiveness of water management during times of drought.  
Ultimately, the quantitative data did show a minor relationship between drought and political 
stability in Venezuela and Syria, particularly when accounting for the delayed effects of drought.  
The case studies highlight the importance of effective water management policy in addressing 
drought.  Years of neglect and ineptitude left Venezuela with a deteriorating infrastructure, 
insufficient for proper water and electrical management prior to the 2013 drought.  While the 
data suggests that the drought did aggravate the situation in Venezuela, it became increasingly 
apparent that preexisting infrastructure deficiencies were largely responsible for water scarcity 
and thus played a much greater role in the current situation.   
Research Study Advisor: Sarah Clark 





First and foremost, I would like to thank Jenni for supporting me over the last couple of years 
while I pursued this degree.  You have been an unwavering source of encouragement and 
strength.  Mom and Dad, I cannot thank you enough for your continued support.  To my 
professors, you have all made the pursuit of this degree a wonderful and life-changing 
experience.  I hope I can use what I have learned to contribute in some humble manner to 









Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................... v 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
Literature Review ............................................................................................................................ 4 
Hypothesis ..................................................................................................................................... 13 
Method .......................................................................................................................................... 14 
Data ............................................................................................................................................... 15 
Quantitative ............................................................................................................................... 15 
Case Studies: Venezuela ............................................................................................................. 17 
Syria........................................................................................................................................ 23 
Turkey ..................................................................................................................................... 27 
Uzbekistan .............................................................................................................................. 30 
Discussion ...................................................................................................................................... 32 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 37 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 39 


























List of Figures 
 
Figure 1:  Environmental Scarcity and Poor Management Combine to Create Water Scarcity…..14 
 
Figure 2: Scatterplot Political Stability and Drought: Venezuela and Syria (Even Years) ……………16 
Figure 3: Scatterplot Political Stability and Drought: Venezuela and Syria (Plus 1 Year) ……………17 





















Venezuela has been in a steady socioeconomic and political decline since former 
President Hugo Chavez began his “experiment with 21st century socialism” upon his 1999 
election.1  The descent continues as Chavez’s replacement, Nicolas Maduro, has sustained the 
“chavismo” governing style best summarized as “failed socialist policies—price and currency 
controls, farm and factory nationalizations, [and] government control of food distribution…” 
accompanied by widespread corruption, “cronyism, and plain incompetence.”2  The Venezuelan 
gross domestic product (GDP) has declined nearly 50 percent since Maduro’s 2013 ascension to 
the presidency, coupled with a 70 percent reduction in imports.3  In the wake of this economic 
decline, 87 percent of Venezuelan households are in poverty, with over 60 percent living in 
extreme poverty.4  The resulting “humanitarian crisis” and an increasingly authoritarian Maduro 
government has led to “the largest migration and refugee crisis the Western hemisphere has 
seen in modern history.”5  In June 2019, the United Nations announced four million Venezuelans 
had sought refuge beyond its borders,6 rivaling the exodus of Syrians in 2013 and 2014.  The 
magnitude of Venezuelan migration has placed a significant amount of stress on the entire 
region and poses a substantial international challenge.7  Those that have remained in the 
 
1 Moises Naim and Francisco Toro, Venezuela is Falling Apart, THE ATLANTIC (May 12, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/05/venezuela-is-falling-apart/481755/. 
2 Uri Friedman, How Populism Helped Wreck Venezuela, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/venezuela-populism-fail/525321/ see also Naim. 
3 Dany Bahar, Ted Piccone, and Harold Trinkunas, “Venezuela: A Path out of Misery,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, 
(October 2018): 3, 4.  
4 Id. at 4. 
5 Id.  at 4. 
6 UN News, “Four million have now fled Venezuela, UN ramps up aid to children who remain,” (June 7, 2019), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1040001. 
7 Bahar, supra at 1, 5.   
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country have voiced their displeasure through widespread protests and growing support of 
opposition leader Juan Guadio.8  
There is not one simple reason for the Venezuelan crisis.  The successes and failures of 
all nations, and societies in general, are the net sum of intricately woven social, political, 
economic, and environmental factors.  The systemic failure in Venezuela is undoubtedly a 
complex and multi-faceted phenomenon.  However, it is of note that in recent years this crisis 
has coincided with a severe multi-year drought, from 2013 to 2016.9  While drought in the 
region is not uncommon, this particular drought has been labeled by Venezuelan meteorologists 
as the most severe in at least the last forty years.10 
This is significant as the United Nations, in its 2019 Global Assessment Report on 
Disaster Reduction Risk,  classified drought as “probably the most complex and severe” weather 
event “due to its intrinsic nature and wide-ranging and cascading impacts.”11  Drought affects a 
multitude of systems, ranging from agricultural yield to energy production.12  The impacts  
“develop slowly, are often indirect and can linger for long times after the end of the drought,” 
and the effects are less apparent than those of other natural disasters.13  Such effects are often 
difficult to conceptualize due to drought’s “creeping” nature and the lack of a universally 
applicable definition of “drought,” resulting from the array of geographically diverse climates.14 
 
8 BBC, “Venezuela protests: ‘Four dead’ as thousands rally against Maduro,” (Jan. 23, 2019): 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46970620. 
9 Jean Chemnick, “Where Climate Change Fits into Venezuela’s Ongoing Crisis,” Scientific American E&E News: 
Climate, (February 18, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/where-climate-change-fits-into-venezuela-
rsquo-s-ongoing-crisis/.  
10 Keith Schneider, “Venezuela Drought Aggravates Instability,” Circle of Blue (June 10, 2016), 
https://www.circleofblue.org/2016/world/venezuela-drought-aggravates-instability/.  
11 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR) (2019), Chapter 6, 171, https://gar.unisdr.org/report-
2019. 
12 Id. at 171. 
13 Id. at 171. 
14 Id. at 193. 
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Over the past few decades, scholars have debated the impact of environmental scarcity 
on both intra- and interstate conflict.15  As will be examined below, conclusions have varied as 
to whether environmental scarcity, to include water scarcity, increases the probability of 
political unrest and conflict.  While there is an apparent dichotomy among the scholars as to 
whether scarcity increases the risk of conflict, there is generally more nuance to the debate than 
a simple “yes or no” answer.  There is an apparent consensus, however, that it is a complicated 
issue.   
Water scarcity itself is a multifaceted issue, as it “can mean scarcity in availability due to 
physical storage, or scarcity in access due to the failure of institutions to ensure a regular supply 
or due to a lack of adequate infrastructure.”16  As a result, both the environment and the 
effectiveness of water management are contributory factors.  Effective management will reduce 
vulnerability and alleviate the effects of drought.  Conversely, poor management policies can 
amplify the effects of drought and increase the likelihood of scarcity.  Reduced precipitation 
does not necessarily cause water stress, but poor management will increase the likelihood of 
scarcity.17  Understanding the role of water management is critical to assessing the true impact 
of drought, as ineffective management can lead to scarcity even during times of environmental 
abundance.   
The objective of this study is to assess the impact of the 2013 drought on the current 
socioeconomic and political state of Venezuela, which will include an assessment of Venezuelan 
water management.  As drought becomes increasingly persistent and severe in many areas of 
 
15 See generally Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Amanda E. Wooden, “Water resources, institutions, & intrastate 
conflict,” Political Geography (29) (2010): 444-453.   
16 United Nations, “Water Scarcity,” UN Water: Water Facts; Scarcity, https://www.unwater.org/water-facts/scarcity/. 
17 Hussam Hussein, “Lifting the veil: Unpacking the discourse of water scarcity in Jordan,” Environmental Science and 
Policy 89 (2018): 385-392.   
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the world due to the effects of climate change,18 many nations will be forced to confront the 
bevy of complex challenges that accompany drought.  Venezuela provides an example of a 
nation that was confronted by drought while in the midst of socioeconomic and political 
bedlam, a situation not unique to many of the world’s most water stressed nations.19  The 
importance of this research question is twofold: to determine the impact of the Venezuelan 
drought and provide insight into the role of effective water management in mitigating the 
effects of drought.  Hopefully, this will add to our understanding of the effects of drought and 
the role that water management must play to combat the effects of climate change.  This is of 
critical importance as approximately one-quarter of the world lives in regions with “‘extremely 
high’ levels of baseline water stress.”20 
While Venezuela is yet to reach the depths of civil war, there has been a bubbling of 
intrastate conflict in the form of civil unrest, political protest, and opposition movements.  To 
assess the impact of the drought, I will take a two-step approach.  First, I will perform a brief 
quantitative analysis specific to the effects of drought on political stability within Venezuela and 
Syria.  I choose Syria as many experts have opined that drought was a significant factor in the 
current civil war.  I will then turn to case studies of Venezuela, Syria, Turkey, and Uzbekistan to 
look more broadly at socioeconomic factors and water management policy.  
Literature Review 
 
There is notable disagreement within the literature as to whether the evidence supports 
a finding that environmental degradation, to include water scarcity, is a primary or contributory 
 
18 United Nations, “Water Scarcity,” UN Water: Water Facts; Climate Change, https://www.unwater.org/water-
facts/climate-change/. 
19 Paul Reig, et. al, “World’s 36 Most Water-Stressed Countries,” World Resource Institute (Dec. 12, 2013), 
https://www.wri.org/blog/2013/12/world-s-36-most-water-stressed-countries.  
20 Rutger Willem Hofste, et. al, “17 Countries, Home to One-Quarter of the World’s Population, Face Extremely High 




factor in conflict.  As noted, this research question will focus primarily on intrastate conflict.  
Thomas Homer-Dixon is perhaps the most recognized scholar in the camp that argues there is a 
strong correlation between environmentally related scarcity and conflict.  He theorized that 
scarcity would result in “sub-national, persistent, and diffuse” conflict21 and identified six 
specific types of “environmental change” that may result in violent conflict, including “depletion 
and pollution of fresh water supplies.”22  
Robert Kaplan built upon the earlier work of Homer-Dixon, concurring with his opinion 
that “future wars and civil violence will often arise from scarcities of resources such as 
water….”23  Kaplan characterized the environment as a “hostile power” analogous to a rival 
nation state and suggested that environmental stress would fundamentally alter nation states, 
resulting in “totalitarianism (as in Iraq), fascist-tending mini-states (as in Serb-held Bosnia), or 
road-warrior cultures (as in Somalia).”24  Accordingly, environmental hostility could cause or 
aggravate future subnational conflict and ignite cultural and “tribal” divides that would ignore 
national borders and ultimately lead to the demise of susceptible nation states.25  This mirrored 
Homer-Dixon’s theory that intranational conflict stemming from environmental degradation 
would likely result in either the “fragment[ation]” or hardening of states in the form of 
increased authoritarianism.26 
While Homer-Dixon and Kaplan addressed environmental scarcity more generally, 
Cullen Hendrix and Idean Salehyan completed a focused assessment on the relationship 
between rainfall deviation and intrastate conflict.  They found a “curvilinear relationship 
 
21 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International 
Security 19 (1) (Summer 1994): 6. 
22 Id. at 6. 
23 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly 
destroying the social fabric of our planet,” The Atlantic Monthly, (Feb. 1994): 59. 
24 Id. at 57-59. 
25 Id. at 74, generally. 
26 Homer-Dixon, supra at 40. 
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between rainfall and social conflict,” including both positive and negative deviations from the 
mean: both drier and wetter conditions could lead to increased incidents of political conflict.27  
Their definition of conflict encompassed a “broad[] spectrum of social conflict” and 
“demonstrate[d] a robust relationship between environmental shock and unrest.”28 
In a 2017 report, CNA evaluated the relationship between water scarcity and 
intrastate/interstate conflict, using the framework of a conflict continuum, which included: “Civil 
Unrest and Instability”; “Localized Violence”; “Terrorism, Insurgencies, and Civil Wars”; and 
“State-on-State Conflict.”29  Ultimately, CNA concluded that water scarcity can be the primary 
cause of “civil unrest and localized violence….[w]hen combined with other negative factors such 
as poor governance, poor water management practices, or preexisting social tensions.”30  In 
addition, it can act as a contributory factor in intrastate conflicts.31 
In a 2012 study focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, Conor Devitt and Richard Tol opine that 
“drought does impact the probability of civil war,” even after a sensitivity analysis accounting for 
non-climate related risks of conflict.32  Their study included an in-depth analysis of a feedback 
model involving climate change, civil war, and economic growth.  Ultimately, they reached the 
intuitive conclusion that “[e]conomic growth reduces the probability of civil war and the 
vulnerability to climate change,” to include drought.33 
On the other side of the spectrum, Ole Magnus Theisen argues that data does not 
support the hypothesis that environment scarcity leads to conflict.  Rather, he asserts that 
 
27 Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, “Climate Change, rainfall, and social conflict in Africa,” Journal of Peace 
Research 49(1) (2012): 46. 
28 Id. at 35. 
29 CNA, “The Role of Water Stress in Instability and Climate” (2017): 13,  https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/pdf/CRM-
2017-U-016532-Final.pdf.  
30 Id. at 2.  
31 Id. at 47.  
32 Conor Devitt and Richard SJ Tol, “Civil war, climate change, and development: A scenario study for sub-Saharan 
Africa,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol 49(1), Special Issue: Climate Change and Conflict (January 2012): 129-45, 131. 
33 Id.  at 141. 
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“proxies for development, state strength and institutional instability” are much greater 
indicators of conflict than resource scarcity.34  In a 2012 case study of Kenya, Theisen 
determined that contrary to the scarcity-conflict theory, conflict was actually more likely in the 
aftermath of “wetter years” than in years with less precipitation.  He attributes this to the 
difficulty of mounting any type of opposition or initiating violence during times of scarcity.35   
In a subsequent article, Theisen collaborated with Helge Holterman and Halvard Buhaug 
to dispute the common assertion that climate change would directly cause conflict, as such a 
theory is not supported by “solid scientific evidence.”  They critique reports by the United States 
Military, Intelligence Community, and statements by President Obama.  Theisen et. al. 
distinguish the purported climate-conflict link from the clear scientific evidence supporting 
projected climatic changes.36  In providing “a rigorous assessment of the claim that drought and 
water shortages increase the risk of civil war” with a focus on African countries,37 they 
ultimately conclude that “there is no direct, short-term relationship between drought and civil 
war onset, even within contexts presumed most conducive to violence.”38 Their study suggests 
that reported scarcity conflicts were actually rooted in ethnic and cultural divisions.39 
Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ragnhild Nordas agree, opining that the concern over climate 
related conflict is based on little evidence.  They critique the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change for “fall[ing] prey to the temptation of relying on second- or third-hand 
information with little empirical backing in its scattered comments on the implications of 
 
34 Ole Magnus Theisen, “Blood and Soil? Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict Revisited,” Journal of Peace 
Research 45 (6) (2008): 814-15. 
35 Ole Magnus Theisen, “Climate clashes? Weather variability, land pressure, and organized violence in Kenya: 1989 – 
2004,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol 49(1) Special Issue: Climate Change and Conflict (January 2012): 81-96, 93. 
36 Ole Magnos Theisen, Helge Holtermann, and Halvard Buhaug, “Climate Wars? Assessing the Claim That Drought 
Breeds Conflict,” International Security 36(3) (Winter 2011/12): 79. 
37 Id. at 80, 102. 
38 Id. at 105. 
39 Id. at 106. 
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climate change for violent conflict.”40  While acknowledging the work of Homer-Dixon and 
similarly minded theorists, they highlight the difficulty of establishing a scarcity-conflict 
relationship as “it was impossible to generalize from studies only of cases with conflict.”41  
Conversely, they reference a 2005 study by Indra De Soysa42 contending that “resource 
abundance, particularly in poor countries with weak institutions, have a greater impact on 
conflict than resource scarcity.”43  Ultimately, Gleditsch and Nordas appear to fall short of 
manifestly rejecting the scarcity-conflict hypothesis, instead concluding that the Homer-Dixon 
based “folk wisdom” is unsupported by current data and that “there is little if any solid evidence 
that we are going to see an increase in armed conflicts as a result of climate change.”44   
Gregory Dunn came to a similar conclusion regarding water scarcity: “[w]hile the 
degradation of natural resources is a serious problem with modern society, the lack of water 
wars serves as a reminder of the power of forces of peace and prosperity that are an inherent 
part of the modern world.”45  Dunn acknowledges that water shortages will most deeply impact 
those citizens of a nation with less political power and economic resources, potentially resulting 
in an insurgency.  While Dunn asserts that such an insurgency would have little actual impact on 
that country,46 this seems to be a somewhat contradictory finding as an insurgency would 
amount to civil conflict.   
 
40 Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ragnhild Nordas, “Climate Change and Conflict: A Critical Overview,” Die Friedens-Warte, 
Sonderausgabe (2010): 8. 
41 Id. at 9. 
42 Indra de Soysa, Filthy Rich, Not Dirt Poor! How Mother Nature Nurtures Civil Violence (2005) (in Peter Dauvergne 
(ed.): International Handbook of Global Environmental Politics (London: Elgar) p. 149-169. 
43 Gleditsch, supra at 9. 
44 Id. at 18. 
45 Gregory Dunn, “Water Wars: A Surprisingly Rare Source of Conflict,” Harvard International Review 35 (2) (Fall 
2013): 49. 
46 Id. at 49.  
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Beyond the scarcity-conflict nexus, Hussam Hussein explains that water scarcity may be 
the result of two separate entities: “water insufficiency and water mismanagement.”47  Water 
insufficiency may result from climate, specifically drought, while water mismanagement is the 
result of poor policy specific to water resources.  The aforementioned CNA report expands upon 
Hussein’s water scarcity model, highlighting “poor water management, dwindling aquifers, 
demographic changes that increase demand for more water-intense food, and the growing use 
of water resources in energy production.”48  As will be discussed below, the reliance on water 
for energy production is a critical issue in Venezuela.  
Hussein Amery establishes five specific phases of “water development, supply and 
management” as a country develops and water management evolves: (1) Manual supply phase; 
(2) Mechanical supply phase; (3) Early conservation phase; (4) Intermediate conservation phase; 
and (5) Advanced conservation phase.49  He provides an insightful analysis as to how various 
nations in the Middle East, among the world’s most water stressed regions, have approached 
water management.50  Understanding the importance of water management, the natural follow-
up question is: what constitutes good water management? 
In assessing water security in the historical Levant region, Ido Bar and Gerald Stang 
highlight three critical components to an effective water management strategy: (1) conservation 
efforts to “match[] demand with sustainable supply”; (2) “greater diversification of water 
sources”; and (3) “investment in infrastructure…including transport and storage facilities and 
 
47 Hussam Hussein, “Lifting the veil: Unpacking the discourse of water scarcity in Jordan,” Environmental Science and 
Policy 89 (2018): 385-392.   
48 CNA, supra at 1. 
49 Hussein Amery, “Water-Demand Management in the Arab Gulf States: Implications for Political Stability,” in Water 
Security in the Middle East: Essays in Scientific and Social Cooperation, ed. Jean Axelrad Cahan (London, UK; New York, 
NY, USA: Anthem Press, 2017), 69. 
50 Reig, supra.  
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the development of sustainable sources.”51  Effective water management is in essence finding a 
balance between “demand reduction” and “supply improvement.”  Bar and Stang emphasize 
management efforts “should not occur in isolation but as part of integrated water management 
systems that take into account changing resource availability, climate impacts and population 
needs when planning infrastructure and agriculture.”52  This “comprehensive approach,” they 
argue, is necessary to adequately address the various political, security, economic, and 
environmental issues that are intertwined with water availability.53 
Katharine Jacobs and other experts also tout the need for a comprehensive approach, 
highlighting the technical and political challenges associated with water management “for 
sustainable use and economic development.”54  These challenges, they argue, are best met by 
policy which fully considers the full spectrum of relevant issues: “To be effective, knowledge 
systems that support decision about water-resource management and development must link 
research- and experience-based knowledge to practices across a broad range of challenges.”55   
Bar and Stang note that the European Union has been at the forefront of the 
comprehensive approach, as indicated in part by the European Council’s 2013 “new conclusions 
on water diplomacy…prioritising [sic] integrated and cooperative responses” to help address the 
nexus between water scarcity, security, and water management.56  The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has praised the work of the European Union, 
stating that the EU Water Framework Directive has been one of the “legal frameworks [to] have 
 
51 Ido Bar and Gerald Stang, “Water and insecurity in the Levant,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief 
Issue 15 (2016), 4. 
52 Id. at 4. 
53 Id. at 3. 
54 Katharine Jacobs, et. al, “Linking knowledge with action in the pursuit of sustainable water-resources 
management,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 23 (17) (April 
26, 2016), 4591. 
55 Id. at 4591. 
56 Bar, supra at 3. 
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triggered major evolutions in water policy,” despite facing some “governance bottlenecks.”57  
OECD’s “Principles on Water Governance” apply many of the EU’s water management 
strategies.   
The OECD acknowledges that “[w]ater policy is inherently complex and strongly linked 
to domains that are critical for development, including health, environment, agriculture, energy, 
spatial planning, regional development and poverty alleviation.”58  It further explains that there 
is a growing understanding that “bottom-up and inclusive decision-making is key to effective 
water policies,” yet the comprehensive approach “has brought uneven results within and across 
countries,” in part due to failures to properly account for “the short, medium and long term in a 
consistent and sustainable way.”59  Importantly, OECD notes “that there is not a one-size-fits-all 
solution to water challenges worldwide,” and that appropriate policy must account for specific 
national and regional context.60  To help address the challenges of water governance, OECD 
presents 12 specific “Principles” of water management, premised on three foundational, 
“mutually reinforcing and complementary dimensions of water governance”: (1) effectiveness; 
(2) efficiency; and (3) trust and engagement.61  OECD’s assessment that “[w]ater crises are often 
primarily ‘governance’ crises”62 mirrors Bar and Stang’s conclusion that “in richer countries, 
resource challenges are less about availability than about prioritization, management and 
governance.  Water is both a technical and a political issue.”63   
Jeannie Sowers evaluation of water scarcity in the Middle East provides discussion of 
the water-energy nexus, relevant here due to Venezuela’s heavy reliance on hydropower.  She 
 
57 OECD Principle of Water Governance, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2015), 3, 
https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regional-policy/OECD-Principles-on-Water-Governance.pdf. 
58 Id. at 2. 
59 Id. at 3. 
60 Id. at 3. 
61 Id. at 3, 9-12. 
62 Id. at 2. 
63 Bar, supra at 3. 
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highlights the intuitive conclusion that an increasing reliance on hydropower heightens the 
importance of the water-energy nexus.  More importantly though, she directs the discussion of 
water scarcity away from water stress indexes and statistics, such as precipitation, often cited by 
policymakers.  Rather, she notes the well understood premise that “water and energy 
vulnerability is not simply equivalent to scarcity of the resource.”64  Water management is most 
effective when understanding “vulnerability and risk in relation to the basic uses of energy and 
water,” rather than focusing on physical scarcity.65  Much of the vulnerability, she argues, is 
dependent “upon government policies and infrastructure, economic purchasing power and 
other factors not reducible to physical scarcity.”66  Relevant to the discussion below, she notes 
that the over-extraction of groundwater is a common mistake.67 
The importance of water governance in the scarcity equation is becoming increasingly 
well understood.  The United Nations has created a “User’s Guide on Assessing Water 
Governance” to help address what it has determined to be “one of the major global challenges 
today…”68 
The governance of available water resources becomes the key 
issue to achieve water security at the local, regional, and global 
level.  Poor resource management, corruption, lack of 
appropriate institutions, bureaucratic inertia, insufficient 
capacity and a shortage of new investments undermine the 
 
64 Jeannie Sowers, “Water, Energy and Human Insecurity in the Middle East,” Middle East Report, No. 271, Fuel & 
Water: The Coming Crises (Summer 2014), 3 
65 Id. at 2. 
66 Id. at 2-3. 
67 Id. at 4. 





effective governance of water in many places around the 
world.69  
The World Resources institute has begun the process of creating a “global comparable 
geodatabase of public water management indicators to spur tangible improvements in water 
management.”70 
While the literature is full of work assessing the scarcity-conflict nexus and outlining 
effective water management, there does not appear to be as much work encompassing the full 
spectrum of management, scarcity, and intrastate conflict.  By assessing the effects of drought 
and water management on intrastate conflict in Venezuela, this study will prove a useful 
addition to the literature and help bridge an apparent gap between the scarcity and 
management literature.   
Hypothesis 
 
I hypothesize that the drought between 2013 and 2016 significantly contributed to 
water scarcity in Venezuela, which in turn has severely aggravated the preexisting 
socioeconomic and political disorder, contributing to a greater degree of civil unrest and 
instability.  For this study, intrastate conflict will generally refer to the first two categories of the 
aforementioned CNA conflict spectrum: civil unrest and instability, and localized violence.71  I 
am not suggesting that the drought is a primary cause of the turmoil or that Venezuela would 
have rebounded in the absence of drought.  Rather, I hypothesize that the drought had a 
significant negative impact on the ongoing crisis, in part due to critical vulnerabilities stemming 
from poor water management policies of the Maduro regime.  Thus, drought and poor water 
 
69 Id. at 2. 
70 Julian Kolbel, et. al, “Mapping Public Water Management by Harmonizing and Sharing Corporate Water Risk 
Information,” World Resources Institute (March 2018), 1, https://www.wri.org/publication/mapping-public-water.  
71 CNA, supra at 19. 
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management in Venezuela led to significant water scarcity from 2013 to 2016, which in turn 
directly and indirectly impacted a number of preexisting economic, political, and social issues.  







To test this hypothesis, I will consider the two questions presented by the literature 
above: the causative effect of water scarcity on intrastate conflict and the impact of water 
resource management on scarcity.  First, I will perform a brief quantitative analysis to assess the 
correlation between drought and intrastate conflict, as defined above.  This will be done with a 
bivariate regression to assess whether there is a relationship between measures of drought and 
political instability.   I will use an index of “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” 
compiled by the World Bank in its Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project.72  The WGI 
explains that this index “measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically-motivated violence.”73  To quantify the degree of drought, I will use findings from the 
Standardised Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index.74  Political stability and the absence of 
violence will be the dependent variable.  Drought will be the independent variable.  My 
assessment will focus on Venezuela and Syria. 
 
72 World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” (2019) 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.  
73 Id.  
74 The Standardised Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI), https://spei.csic.es/index.html. 
Drought 
Poor Water Management 
Exacerbation of Preexisting Political 




I will then turn to case studies of Venezuela, Syria, Turkey, Uzbekistan, focusing on 
periods of multi-year drought within each country.  These studies seek to evaluate the effects of 




The WGI Index of political stability and absence of violence (dependent variable) ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).75  This index is compiled from “a research 
dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of 
enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries…[it is] 
gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, 
international organizations, and private sector firms.”76 
The Standardised Precipitation-Evapotranspiration (SPEI) Index (independent variable) is 
“a multiscalar drought index based on climatic data.  It can be used for determining the onset, 
duration and magnitude of drought conditions with respect to normal conditions in a variety of 
natural and managed systems such as crops, ecosystems, rivers, water resources, etc.”77  It uses 
a numerical range similar to the WGI index, however, the data is specific to predetermined areas 
of land shown as pixels.  As a result, I have compiled the average of the pixels within Venezuela 
and Syria.   
The data used is from 2004 to 2017.  The WGI index is annual and I calculated the 
annual averages from the SPEI.  I ran three separate regressions in an effort to account for the 
delayed onset of drought impact.  The first regression matches the WGI and SPEI indexes by year 
(i.e. 2006 with 2006).  The second matches the SPEI index with the WGI index of the following 
 
75 World Bank, WGI. 
76 Id.  
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year (i.e. 2006 with 2007).  The third matches the SPEI index with the WGI index two years later 
(i.e. 2006 with 2008).   
The most important values for the purposes of this study are the p-value and the r-
squared value.  There are relatively low p-values for each regression, particularly the third 
regression, indicating that we can generally reject the null hypothesis that there is no effect.  
The r-squared values for each regression are as follows: first regression = .062; second 
regression = .059; third regression = .124.  These values give us the proportion of the dependent 
variable (WGI) that can be explained by the independent variable (SPEI).  As a result, this model 
shows that drought accounts for approximately 6 percent, 6 percent, and 12 percent, 
respectively, of variation of political stability.  The third regression shows the greatest 
relationship, which is perhaps expected due to the delayed effects of drought.  While 12 percent 
is a relatively low number, it does suggest somewhat of a relationship when accounting for 
every other potential variable that may impact political stability.  Below are the scatterplots of 
each specific regression.  The independent variable (SPEI) is along the x-axis and the dependent 
variable (WGI) is along the y-axis.  Correlation between the two variables is measured by 
assessing the form, direction, and strength of the data represented on the plot. 
 
 









Case Studies: Venezuela 
 
Venezuelan meteorologists reported that the multi-year drought from 2013 to 2016 is 
the nation’s worst in at least four decades, with nearly the entire country impacted.78  During 
this period, precipitation levels were approximately 50 to 65 percent below average.79  
Agricultural production was directly affected, causing a drastic reduction in rice, corn, and coffee 
yield, and the national livestock herd was indirectly impacted.80  Agriculture accounted for only 
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The Center for Climate and Security, (Feb. 7, 2019), https://climateandsecurity.org/2019/02/07/drought-
mismanagement-and-political-instability-in-venezuela/.  
Figure 3 - Second Regression (Plus 1 Year) 
 
 





approximately five percent of the national GDP.81  However, approximately 60 percent of 
electricity generation in Venezuela comes from hydropower,82 with the majority from the Guri 
dam in the northeastern part of the country.83  Speaking to the effects of the drought, the 
Venezuelan Energy Minister announced in March 2018 that the Fabricio Ojeda dam in the 
western part of Venezuela was operating at 150 megawatts, well short of its capacity of 1,100 
megawatts.  Simultaneously, it was announced that Venezuela was limiting electricity 
nationwide by 14,000 megawatts during periods of peak usage.84 
The drought emerged in the background of the aforementioned socioeconomic and 
political turmoil.  A wealthy country due to natural oil reserves, responsible for approximately 
95 percent of export revenue and half of total revenue, Venezuela is more oil dependent than 
Saudi Arabia.85  In January 2010, Chavez devalued the currency in order to increase oil revenue 
in the face of declining prices, which has led to a variety of ensuing monetary issues.86   Despite 
these efforts of currency manipulation, a 2014 drop in oil prices proved devastating to the 
economy.87  It resulted in a 40 percent devaluation of the state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA).88  As a result of the economic devastation, Maduro announced in November 2014 that 
he would reduce government spending.89   
 
81 The World Bank, “Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP), 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=VE.  
82 IEA International Energy Agency, “Statistics, Venezuela 2016,” 
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el&mode=chart&dataTable=ELECTRICITYANDHEAT.  
83 Ian Bremmer, “Venezuela Goes from Bad to Catastrophe,” Time Magazine, Vol. 187(21) (June 6, 2016). 
84 Anggy Polanco and Isaac Urrutia, “Venezuela begins power rationing as drought causes severe outages,” Reuters: 
World News, (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-blackouts/venezuela-begins-power-
rationing-as-drought-causes-severe-outages-idUSKCN1GS2M5.  
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The resulting economic turmoil has been a substantial factor in the government’s 
inability to provide “even rudimentary law and order,” leading to the capital city of Caracas 
having one of the highest murder rates in the world.90  There are also significant food security 
concerns, with 93 percent of Venezuelans unable to afford adequate food as of 201791 and 
nearly three-quarters of the population involuntarily losing an average of 19 pounds.92  U.S. 
sanctions have led to further deprivations, while simultaneously providing Maduro ammunition 
for his claims that the issues facing Venezuela are the result of a U.S. led conspiracy, as well as 
the persistent drought.93  The Maduro government enacted electrical and water rationing in 
April 2016, including a two-day work week, a four-day school week, and limitations of power 
transmission to manufacturers.94  These shortages have extended beyond 2016,  having a 
significant economic and social impact.  Venezuela’s western cities have felt the effects of water 
scarcity and power outages most severely: 
Business has all but ground to a halt at a time when the OPEC 
nation of 30 million is already suffering hyperinflation and a 
profound recession.  Many Venezuelans are unable to eat 
properly on salaries of just a couple of dollars per month at the 
black market rate, sparking malnutrition, emigration, and 
frequent sights of Venezuelans digging through trash or begging 
in front of supermarkets.95 
 
90 Moises Naim and Francisco Toro, Venezuela is Falling Apart, THE ATLANTIC (May 12, 2016) available at 
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Contrary to the Maduro government narrative that drought is to blame for water 
scarcity,96 resource access and availability issues preexisted the 2013 drought.  The country has 
substantial water reserves; however, 85 percent are in the sparsely populated southeast.  Only 
15 percent of the water reserves are directly available to the more heavily populated portions of 
the country.97  Approximately 80 percent of the population lives in the north and west of the 
country, with 90 percent living in urban areas.98  Infrastructure investments to address these 
geographical complications began in the 1950’s and continued through the 1960’s, however, 
they subsided in the ensuing decades.  The late 1980’s saw the decentralization of the 
Venezuelan water authority into ten regional governing bodies in response to widespread 
complaints about the effectiveness of water management.  In the 2000’s, Chavez further 
fractured water management into “7,000 community ‘roundtables,’” which ultimately failed, 
while simultaneously nationalizing a number of industries, including electricity.99  Ironically, 
water management was a policy priority for Chavez at the time of his 1999 election in an effort 
to maintain widespread political support among the nation’s poor.  For a time, Venezuela was 
even recognized internationally for “its water ‘community-managed infrastructure projects.’”100  
However, limited investment, inadequate maintenance, and ineffective implementation in the 
ensuing years led to a rapidly deteriorating water and electrical infrastructure.101   
What the government did invest, $10 billion towards water and $60 billion toward 
electricity infrastructure between 2006 and 2010, was largely ineffective.102  For instance, public 
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water systems around the capital city of Caracas, with a population of two million, are reliant on 
a network of pumps due to the city’s elevation above sea level.  Thermoelectric plants are 
positioned to act as reserve sources of power in the event that the national electric grid fails, 
such as resulting from diminished hydroelectric generation.  However, according to a former 
state water official, “90 percent of the thermoelectric plants are out of service because they 
haven’t been repaired, maintained or are disconnected from the electrical system.”103  “Highly 
deteriorated” infrastructure is endemic,104 resulting in “perennial” water rationing irrespective 
of drought and water at the Guri dam reaching critical levels in non-drought years, including 
2007 and 2010 – indicative of management issues largely independent of the 2013 multi-year 
drought.105  Recent efforts to reinvigorate the electrical grid, including the increase of 
hydroelectric capacity, have stalled.106 
Maduro’s political opposition claims that the current situation is structural, as opposed 
to circumstantial: the result of continuous “corruption, incompetence….and the politicization of 
the public-utility companies in charge.”107  Rather than well-considered and implemented water 
management and electrical infrastructure projects, “the government has continued ad hoc and 
unaffordable nationalization programmes.”108  Experts suggest that “management has been 
poor due to high ministerial turnover and a lack of technical capacity, while administrative waste 
and profligacy thrived due to poor oversight and limited accountability.”109  This systemic 
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deterioration extends beyond electrical infrastructure, as new drinking water treatment plants 
have not been built for nearly two decades and current plants are increasingly failing, leaving 
insufficient drinking water despite Venezuela being identified by the United Nations as a top-20 
country for freshwater renewable resources.110  Cutbacks in government spending and the 
current socioeconomic and political crisis complicate any efforts to address these systemic 
failures.111 
Political opposition has grown, including anti-government protests in February and 
March 2014 that led to the deaths of 28 civilians.  Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans took 
to the streets to call for Maduro’s resignation in September 2016.112  A controversial 
constitutional assembly was elected in July 2017, which Maduro claimed would lead to an 
improved Venezuelan economy less dependent on oil.113  Despite these claims, millions of 
Venezuelans fled the country during the drought and its aftermath.  Growing protests made a 
“slide into generalized violence” possible as “signs of anarchy [emerged], with radicals on both 
sides slipping loose from their leaders’ control.  Rather than a second Cuba or a tropical China, 
chavista Venezuela, with its corruption, gangs, and ineptitude, risks becoming something much 
worse.”114  Conflict between supporters of the Maduro regime, colectivos, and the opposition 
forces, Resistencia, has increased.115  Some experts have noted that recent protests have 
emerged from poorer regions due in large part to the collapse of basic services, such as water 
and electricity.  This is a notable shift from the largely political protests of prior years.116  In 
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March 2019, violence erupted in Caracas as government forces fired upon protests regarding 
water shortages.117 
From a migration standpoint, Venezuela’s population of approximately 31 million is 
nearly twice that of Syria.118  In 2017, the U.S. State Department noted an increased risk of 
extremism, as the Venezuelan government refused to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts 
for a tenth straight year,119 highlighting an anti-American sentiment born in part from a 
relationship between Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.120   
Syria 
Between 2007 and 2012, Syria experienced one of the worst long-term droughts in its 
recorded history.121  The drought was spearheaded by the winter of 2007 and 2008, which was 
substantially drier than any other winter in the region since the advent of measuring 
technology.122  Periods of at least three consecutive years of below average precipitation are not 
a rarity in Syria.123  However, the three year period beginning in the winter of 2007 was the most 
severe three year drought in recorded history for the entire Fertile Crescent.124  This created a 
significant water deficit in Syria, with 2011 annual withdrawal of renewable water sources 
reaching 160 percent.125  The United States Department of Agriculture reported in its Foreign 
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Agricultural Service Commodity Intelligence Report that the vast majority of Syrian vegetation 
was effected in 2007 and 2008 (97.1 %).126 
The Syrian economy is heavily dependent upon agricultural production, as it accounted 
for approximately 25 percent of the Syrian GDP prior to the drought.  In 2008, that percentage 
dropped to 17 percent127 and by 2010 it was heavily dependent on wheat imports after years of 
mostly exporting.128  Decreased precipitation and agricultural dependency was accompanied by 
years of shortsighted agricultural and water management policies, preceding the current regime 
of Bashar al-Assad.   
Syrian agricultural policy has long focused on self-sufficiency, leading to a number of 
irrigation projects around the turn of the century, in an effort to prioritize “strategic crops.”  This 
focus, according to the World Bank, led Syria to be overly reliant on groundwater extraction and 
dam reservoirs.  Increasing groundwater withdrawals and decreasing precipitation led to falling 
water levels and increased salinity.129  In an effort to increase political support among rural 
farmers, former President Hafez al-Assad pushed policies to aid agricultural yield, such as “land 
redistribution and irrigation projects, quota systems, and subsidies for diesel fuel.”130  Irrigation 
projects between 2002 and 2008 proved largely ineffective, despite a $15 billion investment.  
The government continued to prioritize water needy crops such as cotton and wheat, as they 
were viewed “as part of [the nation’s] identity and a bulwark against foreign dependence.”131  It 
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also nationalized grazing areas, which led to significant overgrazing and substantial 
desertification of critical agricultural areas during the drought.132   
These policies placed a great deal of stress on Syria’s already limited water resources, 
most importantly groundwater.133  Poor management, waste, and overuse led to a 50 percent 
reduction in national water resources between 2002 and 2008.134  Recognizing the critical 
overuse of groundwater, a 2005 law requiring a license for extraction was passed, but has been 
largely ineffective in preventing illegal withdrawals.135  Satellite analysis of vegetation 
productivity indicates that agricultural productivity was further hampered due to overuse of the 
land.136  The Syrian government formally acknowledged the scarcity and agricultural issues 
around 2010 and made some efforts to address the shortages.137   
Ultimately, “poor governance and unsustainable agricultural and environmental 
policies” made Syria woefully unprepared for the extended drought.138  It is important to note 
that historically, Syrian access to water has been impacted by its upstream neighbor Turkey.  
However, during the recent drought Turkey increased downstream flow via the critical 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers.  Syria’s vulnerability was primarily due to a reliance on annual 
rainfall, declining groundwater reserves, heavy dependence on agriculture - particularly in the 
Northeast - and an increased resource demand as compared to previous droughts.139   
 The impact on agriculture was most severe north of the Euphrates river, an area heavily 
occupied by the Kurdish minority.140  Assad’s ongoing attempts at “liberalizing” the economy, 
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which included reducing numerous food subsidies, heightened the effect of production 
declines.141  Food prices increased and poverty became increasingly severe.142  This contributed 
to one and a half million Syrians relocating from rural areas to the peripheries of cities, areas 
that were already inflated due to population growth and Iraqi refugees.143  As of 2010, 20 
percent of the urban population was either displaced Syrians or Iraqi migrants, accounting for an 
increase from just under 9 million to nearly 14 million urban dwellers since 2002.144  According 
to a 2009 report by the United Nations and International Red Cross, “over 800,000 Syrians had 
lost their entire livelihoods.”  A 2011 UN Global Assessment Report of Disaster Risk Reduction 
found that approximately one million were “extremely food insecure.”145  As of 2011, the UN 
estimated that about 9 to 13 percent of the population (2 to 3 million) were living in extreme 
poverty.146  
The now overpopulated urban peripheries became central to the growing civil unrest.147  
The circumstances leading to the ultimate uprising in Syria are highly complex and clearly not 
the sole result of drought.148  It was in large part due to “marginalised [sic] social groups with a 
strong role played by poorer segments in the society, particularly rural and rural-to-urban 
migrants….”149  However, “the [internal] migration in response to the severe and prolonged 
drought exacerbated a number of the factors often cited as contributing to the unrest, which 
include unemployment, corruption, and rampant inequality.  The conflict literature supports the 
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idea that rapid demographic change encourages instability.”150  While the factors behind civil 
unrest are never simple or singular,151 the evidence suggests that the multi-year drought had a 
significant human and economic impact.152 
Turkey 
 
As Syria’s northern neighbor, southeastern Turkey experienced similar drought effects 
between 2007 and 2012.153  It is important to distinguish the climates of eastern and western 
Turkey, as the latter’s weather is heavily influenced by the North Atlantic Oscillation and the 
Mediterranean, whereas eastern Turkey, Syria, and much of the Fertile Crescent are more prone 
to drought and desertification.154  Despite the shared drought conditions, water scarcity was 
much less severe in southeastern Turkey than in neighboring Syria.  Turkey was better prepared 
due in large part to “geographic diversity and investment in the southeast region’s irrigation.”155  
Whereas Venezuelan water management projects were left unfunded and Syrian irrigation 
projects proved ineffective, Turkey effectively implemented critical water infrastructure in the 
southeast.  Turkey withdrew 20 percent of renewable water resources in 2011, compared Syria’s 
160 percent withdrawal rate.156   
 Exemplifying the difference in the drought management policies of Syria and Turkey are 
their respective agricultural yields.  Southeastern Turkey and northeastern Syria, the nation’s 
agricultural epicenter, grow many of the same crops.157  Vegetation analysis during the drought 
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indicates that Turkey saw slight improvement in agricultural productivity, while Syria 
experienced a decline.158  This variance “highlights the role government and private sector 
resource management and infrastructure play in reducing drought vulnerability.”159   
 Compared to Syria, Turkey’s geographic location upstream on the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers is favorable and has aided the country in its ability to maintain a water surplus.  While 
Turkey was willing to increase downstream water flow in both rivers during the drought, 
extensive construction of hydroelectric plants and irrigation infrastructure has led to decreased 
flow and Syrian accusations of water treaty violations.160   
Despite the geographic advantage, it appears that water management and effective 
infrastructure are what distinguished southeastern Turkey’s ability to cope with the drought 
from Syria.   Turkey decentralized and privatized its hydroelectric sector beginning in the 1980’s, 
“which led to further water infrastructure developments as private actors constructed and 
managed dams, water plants, and irrigation systems under the ‘build-operate-transfer’ model 
introduced by the government.”161  Investments and implementation continued throughout the 
1990’s, in a concerted effort to address environmental risks associated with “rapid urbanization 
and industrialization” throughout Turkey.   Much of this infrastructure development was 
spurred by Turkey’s attempt to join the European Union in 1999.  The EU required that Turkey 
comply with the European Union “Water Framework Directive” (WFD):  
This led to the expansion and intensification of the 
government’s resource management policies.  Development 
plans included water management provisions aimed at 
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lessening the impact of drought and frequency of water 
shortages. (citation omitted).  The ongoing refinement of 
Turkey’s water management policies, combined with the 
significant public and private investments made in regulation 
provisions, meant that at the time of the 2007-2009 drought, 
Turkey was considerably better positioned to deal with the 
impacts of drought than its neighbors Iraq and Syria.162 
 
In addition, Turkey is involved in numerous collaborative efforts to limit drought risk.163  
Notably, it was a founding member of the Drought Management Centre for Southeastern 
Europe in 2007, an organization partially financed by the European Union.164  Its mission is “to 
coordinate and facilitate the development, assessment and application of drought risk 
management tools and policies in South-Eastern Europe with the goal of improving drought 
preparedness and reducing drought impacts.”165   
Importantly, Turkey has had the economic capability over the previous decades to invest 
and implement the necessary policies and infrastructure.  This includes both the 
aforementioned international efforts, but also national efforts such as the Turkish Agricultural 
Drought Action Plan, “which outlines priority areas to address preparedness and drought 
mitigation measures.166  Turkey’s involvement in both national and international efforts, as well 
as the economic and political capability to invest and implement as necessary, allowed it to 
escape the socioeconomic stress experienced in Syria, despite facing down the Fertile Crescent’s 
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worst recorded drought in 900 years.167  This is not to suggest that Turkey’s water management 
policies represent the gold standard.  National response to drought is still primarily reactive and 
there is not yet a fully comprehensive drought management strategy”168  Turkey was just 
substantially better equipped than Syria to handle the effects of the 2007 multi-year drought 
due to the steps it had taken. 
Uzbekistan  
 
 Uzbekistan, like most of Central Asia, is generally arid and drought is quite common.  
However, between 2000 and 2001 the region experienced an abnormally severe and lengthy 
drought.169  Specific to Uzbekistan, this drought was uniquely severe due to its wide-ranging 
effects on the economy, water reserves, environment, and its citizenry, particularly in rural 
areas.170  Uzbekistan is highly dependent upon agriculture, accounting for 17 percent of GDP, 27 
percent of employment, and 22 percent of export income.  In addition, 70 percent of domestic 
trade is centered around agricultural production, and domestic production accounts for 90 
percent of demand.171  The vast majority of agricultural production occurs on irrigated land (90 
percent) and the industry accounts for 92 percent of total water use.172  This heavy usage along 
with a major dependence on the continually drying Aral Sea Basin leave a number of 
communities highly vulnerable to limited fresh water supplies.173 
 The drought led to reduction in cereal grain production between 14 and 17 percent and 
other crops between 45 and 75 percent.  Estimates have varied as to the total economic cost of 
reduced yields, ranging from $40 million to $130 million, or 2.4 percent of GDP.174  Outside of 
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agricultural yield, the drought resulted in water resource declines of 20 to 30 percent regionally 
and 35 to 80 percent nationally.175  There were significant socioeconomic impacts and a related 
increase in migration out of Uzbekistan.176 
 Despite government efforts to alleviate the drought’s impacts by providing financial and 
technological support to the most affected regions, a “lack of inter-agency coordination, water 
use control, and failure in water supply” ultimately made such efforts largely unsuccessful.177  
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) determined that “the most dramatic 
reductions in agricultural production took place due to insufficient planning, forecasting, and 
water resource control at regional, national and local levels.”178   
Uzbekistan did have the benefit of a largely intact and generally maintained water 
infrastructure left over from the Soviet era, unlike other Central Asian countries.179  However, 
the Soviet infrastructure had its own technical challenges, as it was designed for a generally 
larger scale and was not as effective in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, as Uzbekistan’s 
agricultural land was broken into smaller farms.  In addition, effective management of the 
existing infrastructure required a technical expertise and institutional assemblance that 
Uzbekistan did not have in place.180  Increased demand, the lack of a coordinated national water 
management effort, and infrastructure not best suited for the particularities of an independent 
Uzbekistan, was further aggravated by the citizens continued treatment of water as a “free 
good,” as it was viewed during the Soviet era.”181  Further impacts were felt due to a political 
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The quantitative data is an admittedly blunt and imperfect tool for this research 
question.  There are many “markers” which can be used to assess the socioeconomic and 
political well-being of a nation, and the WGI index provides a singular assessment, which 
certainly does not capture the full extent of civil unrest or any other variation of intrastate 
conflict.  The SPEI drought index has its own limitations, as the data used is an annual average 
for the entire country and does not account for geographically significant areas, such as the Guri 
dam in Venezuela.  It is ultimately an imperfect tool as used in this study for assessing the 
broader question of a scarcity-conflict relationship.  However, it does provide a useful starting 
point, as the data shows some relationship between the two variables, although perhaps minor.  
Most useful is the third regression which accounts for a two-year delay for the effects of 
drought, suggesting that 12 percent of the variation of the WGI variable is related to the SPEI 
drought index.  This is not insignificant, as it does suggest a relationship between the two 
variables.   
The totality of the effects of the 2013 drought are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify.  
The quantitative data provides some support that drought may be a factor in civil unrest in 
Venezuela and Syria during those specific time periods.  Additional measures, such as a steadily 
declining GDP since 2013, a massive influx in migration, reductions in agricultural yield, and 
government enacted electrical and water rationing further suggest that the socioeconomic and 
political crises in Venezuela was aggravated by the drought.  Again, it is difficult to assess to 
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what degree many of these factors are related to the drought, particularly when it occurred in 
the background of such significant factors as currency manipulation, the 2014 drop in oil prices, 
and countless failed policies.  The case studies provide significant insight into the role of water 
scarcity, drought, and water mismanagement in the Venezuelan situation. 
There is a critical distinction between Venezuela and the other nations in this study: the 
reliance on agriculture.  For instance, the example of Syria provides a much more linear 
argument for the effect of drought on civil unrest and ultimate civil war.  While there is certainly 
debate on the topic, the evidence is more supportive of a link: drought caused significant water 
and food scarcity issues, causing much of the rural population to migrate to urban centers 
where there was increased poverty and other demographic changes as discussed in the CNA 
report, which then led to the ultimate explosion of civil unrest.  There is not such a clear linear 
progression of drought to civil unrest in Venezuela.  While it is notable that such a large portion 
of Venezuelan’s live in urban areas, where political and now more services-based protests have 
erupted, there is not the same instance of internal migration due to drought.  Furthermore, 
there is every indication that many of the services-based issues, water and food security, 
preexisted the 2013 drought. 
Venezuela did not face the same economic issues due to declining agricultural yield, as it 
was less reliant on agriculture as compared to both Syria and Uzbekistan.  While there was 
certainly some monetary impact resulting from declining yield in Venezuela, its primary 
economic issues where due to inept monetary policy, an overreliance on a devaluing 
commodity, and a failing electrical grid.  Both Syria and Uzbekistan faced significant 
socioeconomic consequences as a direct result of agricultural decline, something that the data 
above can more clearly point directly to drought, even if it was not the only culprit.   
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Despite its own management inadequacies, the case of Turkey helps highlight the true 
culprit of water scarcity in Venezuela, Syria, and Uzbekistan: failed water management policy.  
Venezuela, Syria and Uzbekistan lacked a comprehensive national approach to water 
management as outlined by the literature above, most notably the European Union, OECD, and 
UN.  Each organization stressed the importance of a comprehensive and well-coordinated water 
management effort, that was forward thinking and encompassing of the necessary regional and 
national particularities.  Such principles are consistent with the scholarly work addressing water 
management.   
Turkey was better able to implement such water management policies, in part due its 
introduction to the EU framework in 1999, but also its economic capability and political will to 
take action.  While Venezuela may at one time have had the economic capability to undertake 
the necessary institutional steps along with adequate investment, it lacked the political will and 
foresight.  Rather, it relied on ad hoc water management and infrastructure solutions.  It is 
unclear to what degree it now has either the economic capability or political will to take such 
steps.  Syria provides a similar cautionary tale of ad hoc water management: it is simply 
inadequate to address what the OECD and the other literature makes clear is an “inherently 
complex” issue that is “strongly linked to domains that are critical for development.”183  While 
Uzbekistan was perhaps more responsive than both Venezuela and Syria, it still ultimately 
suffered from the same lack of a comprehensive management plan. 
In their 2017 study regarding the water management policies of Syria, Turkey, and Iraq, 
Lina Eklund and Darcy Thompson concluded that: 
it becomes clear that the severity of the effects of the drought 
are the outcome of biophysical as well as political and 
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socioeconomic factors.  On a broader level, our study 
demonstrates that vulnerability to drought can be positively or 
negatively affected by resource management strategies.  
Looking only at the severity of the drought in terms of 
precipitation does not necessarily provide an accurate 
representation of the “effects” on the ground.184 
Eklund and Thompson’s conclusion mirrors that of the OECD when citing water scarcity as 
“often primarily ‘governance’ crises”185 and Sowers in her distinction between drought statistics 
and water scarcity.  Critical here is the understanding that water scarcity in many cases is an 
issue of poor management, and not necessarily linked to drought.  Drought can exacerbate 
preexisting water scarcity resulting from poor management strategies or other socioeconomic 
factors.   However, in Venezuela, poor water management policy, which included a crumbling 
infrastructure, played the role of Kaplan’s “hostile power,”186 as opposed to mother nature.  The 
case of Venezuela is strong supportive evidence of Theisen’s assertion that “proxies for 
development, state strength and institutional instability” are the true indicators of political 
instability.187  
The data above makes a strong case that water scarcity played a significant role in the 
socioeconomic and political decline of Venezuela.  However, water scarcity preexisted the 
drought and was largely independent of meteorological factors.  Venezuela provides a shining 
example of Ido and Stang’s assertion that scarcity issues in wealthy countries are the result of 
“prioritization, management, and governance,” as opposed to environmental factors.188  The 
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evidence shows that water scarcity in Venezuela was rooted in years of mismanagement, 
corruption, and countless other forms of poor governance.  Water scarcity itself played a 
significant role in Venezuela’s decline into civil unrest and economic turmoil, consistent with 
much of the conflict-scarcity literature detailed above.  While many of these factors, specifically 
poor water management, made Venezuela more susceptible to the effects of the 2013 drought, 
it does not appear to have been a significant factor in Venezuela’s decline.  Analogous to how a 
healthy body and immune system may ward off a minor cold virus with little ill effect, but a 
weakened immune system may render the body highly vulnerable to that same virus, drought 
likely exacerbated the situation in Venezuela.  However, it is clear that the primary contributor 
to water scarcity, a substantial factor in the Venezuelan decline, was poor management and not 
environmental scarcity resulting from the multi-year drought beginning in 2013.   
Accordingly, my hypothesis must be revised from above.  Water scarcity, stemming 
primarily from decades of inept water management, to include lack of investment and 
implementation of infrastructure, played a substantial role in the current socioeconomic and 
political disorder in Venezuela.  This preexisting water scarcity, as well as other socioeconomic 
and political factors, made Venezuela more vulnerable to the effects of the 2013 drought.  To 
this degree, it is likely that the drought did contribute to some degree to Venezuelan instability.  
However, it would appear inaccurate to suggest that the drought itself “severely” aggravated 
the current situation, as preexisting governance issues proved to be the primary factor in water 
scarcity.  Initially, the country’s heavy reliance on hydropower seemed to be a clear vulnerability 
in the face of drought.  However, it becomes quickly apparent that Sower’s premise that water-
energy related vulnerability is the primary result of infrastructure and policy rather than physical 
scarcity proved true in Venezuela.  The impact of Venezuela’s faltering electrical grid on the 
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socioeconomic situation is significant, as evidenced above.  However, like most other issues, it 
was the result of inept governance that preexisted the drought. 
Conclusion  
 
It is apparent that water scarcity has played a significant role in the Venezuelan crisis, 
manifesting in the repeated failure of the hydroelectrical grid, water rationing, and other 
associated issues.  In this manner, water scarcity has had a profound socioeconomic impact in 
Venezuela.  It is, however, less apparent that the 2013 to 2016 drought played a significant 
contributory role in Venezuelan water scarcity.  There is some data suggesting that the 
socioeconomic and political crisis was impacted by the drought.  However, it is clear that many 
of these issues preexisted the drought, due to a crumbling infrastructure, limited investment, 
inept resource management, corruption, and geographical limitations.  Venezuelan water 
scarcity, and the resulting impacts, were more directly linked to these failures of governance 
then the environmental phenomena between 2013 and 2016.  The case studies confirm that 
government policy may either alleviate or exacerbate the effects of drought.  While it seems 
that the drought effects aggravated many of these preexisting conditions, the lack of a 
comprehensive and effective water management plan is the primary culprit of water scarcity in 
Venezuela.  Oil wealth could not save Venezuela from its own failed policies and short-sighted 
governance, as its failure to invest adequately in its own infrastructure created a water scarcity 
issue independent of drought.  
Venezuela, like Syria and Uzbekistan, prove to be cautionary tales of the importance of 
effective water management in addressing the future effects of climate change, specifically the 
increased severity and duration of droughts.  Further research into the link between climate 
change and conflict, as critiqued by Gleditsch and Nordas above, should adequately address the 
role of water management in limiting future conflict.  Similarly, it will be interesting to see how 
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water management frameworks as suggested by the EU continue to evolve in the face of climate 
change.  Other potential areas of future research include a more comprehensive quantitative 
analysis encompassing an index for water management, such as the aforementioned World 
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